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On June 21, 1973, the United States Supreme Court announced
a series of decisions which inevitably will have far reaching con-
sequences.' The purpose of this article is to examine critically the
rationale of those decisions and to assess their actual and potential
impact. An exhaustive review of the history of obscenity in the
courts is not contemplated nor necessary. Abler attempts at com-
prehensive treatment have, on occasion, been performed by mem-
bers of the Court, as well as by scholars in the field.2 Constitu-
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1. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973);
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
2. See for example, the dissenting opinions of Brennan and Douglas,
JJ, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973), and the
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tional history will be employed only insofar as it has a direct bear-
ing upon the new guidelines announced by the Court and what
one can expect from their subsequent application.
Marvin Miller, the Defendant-Appellant in the first case, was
arrested, tried and convicted under California Penal Code §
311.2(a) for "knowingly distributing obscene matter."3  The con-
viction was based upon Miller's having sent unsolicited advertising
brochures through the mail to a restaurant in Newport Beach, Cali-
fornia. The manager of the restaurant complained to the police.
The brochures advertised four books and a film. The Court's
characterization of the brochures was:
While the brochures contain some descriptive printed material, pri-
marily they consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly de-
picting men and women in groups of two or more engaging in
a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently dis-
played.4
The Court vacated Miller's conviction and remanded the case to
the Appellate Department, Superior Court, Orange County, in light
of its decision to reformulate the guidelines on what may be re-
garded as obscene.
ANALYSIS OF DEcIsIONs
Miller was used by the Court as the major vehicle to announce
the adoption of the new standards:
exhaustive historical analysis compiled by Lockhart & McClure, Censorship
of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standard, 45 MINN. L. ,REV.
5 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure].
3. CAr.. PEm. CODE § 311.2(a) (West Supp. 1973) reads in part:
Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or
brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribu-
tion, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distrib-
utes, or offers to distribute, any obscene matter, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor...
CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1973) defined as "obscene" material,
... that to the average person applying contemporary standards
the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to pru-
rient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters and is mat-
ter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
CAL. Pra. CODE § 311(e) (West Supp. 1973) defined "knowingly" as "hav-
ing knowledge that the matter is obscene." This subsection was amended
after Miller's arrest to read: "(e) "knowingly" means being aware of the
character of the matter of live conduct."
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973). Further disposition of
issues pertaining to Miller's case were confined to brief footnotes. See
notes 1, 12, 13 and 14 of the majority opinion. Id. at 16, 31, 32, 34.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether
"the average person, applying contemporary community stand-
ards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.5
In the decisions which follow Miller, the Court went on to clar-
ify the application of the new standards in several ways: (1) ob-
scenity may be proscribed by the State even where it is offered
only to consenting adults;6 (2) the Constitution does not require
that expert affirmative evidence be presented by the prosecution
to show that the materials are obscene when the materials them-
selves are actually placed into evidence;7 (3) words alone, without
any pictorial depictions of sexual conduct may constitute obscene
material which the State has the right to proscribe;8 and (4) the
rule announced in Stanley v. Georgia9 is specifically limited to pos-
session of obscene materials in the home, and does not afford pro-
tection to the consumer who imports such material for his private
use1 ° or who transports such material in interstate commerce for
private use."
The State's Interest in Controlling Obscenity
In reaffirming the holding in Roth v. United States 2 that "ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press,"'1 the Court concluded:
The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment
that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such
material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to
endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice
Warren's words, the States' "right ... to maintain a decent so-
ciety." [Citation omitted]' 4
The Court's justification for such a conclusion apparently lies in
the existence of evidence of a direct harm produced by obscenity,
either in specific criminal conduct, or in a deleterious effect on
the "tone" or "mode" of society.15 The Court cites the Hill-Link
5. Id. at 24.
6. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
7. Id. at 56. See also Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
8. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 118-120 (1973).
9. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
10. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127-128
(1973).
11. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-143 (1973).
12. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
14. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).
15. See Bickel, On Pornography 1I: Dissenting and Concurring Opin-
[voL. 11: 906, 1974] 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornogra-
phy16 as indicating that "there is at least an arguable correlation
between obscene material and crime."'17
Most of the evidence cited by the Minority Report, however, sug-
gests a correlation between obscenity and anti-social conduct only
insofar as juveniles are concerned. The Majority Report denies
even the significance of this correlation:
[E]mpirical research designed to clarify the question has found
no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials play
a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal be-
havior among youth or adults.'8
Despite the conflicting evidence and inconclusive findings, the
Court took the position that a legislature "could quite reasonably
determine that such a connection does or might exist."' 9  This
language seems to suggest that the Court had adopted a "reason-
able legislature test ' 20 with respect to obscenity. Indeed, the ex-
amples cited by the Court 2' in justifying this proposition all
harken to the post New Deal decisions where the "substantial due
process" theory was discredited.22
Regardless of whether or not one subscribes to the "Preferred
Position Doctrine" articulated by Justice Stone in United States
ions, 22 THE PUBLIc INTEREST 25-26 (1971) quoted with approval by the
Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973).
16. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENIT AND PORNOGRAPHY 456-
505 (New York Times ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CoMIssioN REPORT].
17. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
18. CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 16, at 32.
19. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
20. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21. On the basis of these ["unprovable"] assumptions both Congress
and state legislatures have, for example, drastically restricted as-
sociational rights by adopting antitrust laws, and have strictly reg-
ulated public expression by issuers and dealers in securities, profit
sharing "coupons," and "trading stamps," commanding what they
must and must not publish and announce. [Citations omitted] Un-
derstandably, those who entertain an absolutist view of the First
Amendment find it uncomfortable to explain why rights of asso-
ciation, speech and press should be severely restrained in the mar-
ketplace of goods and money, but not in the marketplace of por-
nography.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1973).
22. "Substantive due process" is the doctrine that the "Due Process"
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose limitations on the
substance of governmental regulation, independent of procedural limita-
tions derived from the due process concept. See CoRwN, LIBERTY AGAINST
GOvERNMNw (1948).
v. Carolene Products Co.,28 State regulation of economic activity
and regulation of material deemed to be obscene are clearly dis-
tinguishable. In the former, the rights of association, speech and
press affected by regulation are clearly incidental to the main pur-
pose of the activity-marketing a product; in the latter, State regu-
ation amounts to a prohibition of the product itself. The distinc-
tion is also one specifically drawn by the Court itself.24
In cases involving advocacy of violent overthrow of government,
the Supreme Court, from 1919 on, has required the State to show
that the utterance sought to be proscribed produced a "clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. '25 Assuming that some cor-
relation does exist between exposure to obscenity and anti-social
behavior, and that such anti-social behavior amounts to a substan-
tive evil which the State, exercising its legitimate police powers
has a right to prevent, there is nothing to suggest that this evil
is greater than that of violent overthrow of the government. No
rational argument has ever been advanced to justify the different
treatment by the Court of obscenity and criminal advocacy.26 Yet
from the Roth case onward, the Court has assumed a priori that
speech dealing with matters of sexual conduct is deserving of less
protection under the First Amendment than speech dealing with
revolution or incitement to riot.
Presented with the opportunity in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Sla-
ton, the Court refused to limit the power of the State in regulating
obscenity to that of safeguarding juveniles and the interests of
unconsenting adults. 27 Granting that an "adult" theatre can pre-
23. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242, 258 (1937); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939);
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 608 (1942); West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 90-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); McKay, The Preference
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1184, 1191-93 (1959).
24. See Shulman, The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Liberty of Con-
tract and Freedom of Speech, 41 YALE L.J. 262 (1931).
25. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Termi-
nello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
26. Not every type of speech occupies the same position on the scale
of values. There is no substantial public interest in permitting
certain kinds of utterances: "the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting of 'fighting' words .... " [Citations
ommitted] We have frequently indicated that the interest in pro-
tecting speech depends upon the circumstances of the occasion.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
27. -In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests
at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even
assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against ex-
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vent exposure to juveniles and unconsenting adults, the Court ar-
gued that an "adult" bookstore could not, for the reason that ob-
scene books and pictures can and are distributed to juveniles off
the premises by adult buyers. 2 In offering this rationale the
Court apparently did not consider that it applies equally to other
products denied juvenile consumption, such as alcohol, tobacco, and
non-prescription birth control devices; nor did it consider the argu-
ment that alternative means of deterrence are available, such as
prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
Finally, in affirming that the State has a valid interest in sup-
pressing obscenity, the Court effectively overruled its prior holding
in Stanley v. Georgia29 that a State may not constitutionally make
knowing possession of obscene materials a crime. Given the rea-
soning in Paris, that the State has the right to suppress obscenity
because of its potentially corrupting influence in society and its
close connection with crime, the interest of the State in controlling
obscenity would apply equally in or out of the home. The Court
apparently has concluded that "depravity" in the privacy of the
home is not likely to diffuse throughout society, but sufficient dan-
ger exists when a person attempts to import such materials from
a foreign country 30 or transport it in interstate commerce8' solely
for private use.
The Court distinguishes Stanley on the grounds that it was not
a First Amendment case. The evidence given for this conclusion
is that three concurring Justices indicated that the case could have
been disposed of on Fourth Amendment grounds.82 This proposi-
tion is refuted by even a superficial reading of the case. In a foot-
note to the specific holding that "the First and Fourteenth Amend-
posure to juveniles and to passersby.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
28. Id. at 58 n.7.
29. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
30. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973).
31. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
Congress could reasonably determine such regulation to be neces-
sary to effect permissible federal control of interstate commerce
in obscene material, based as that regulation is on a legislatively
determined risk of ultimate exposure to juveniles or to the public
and the harm that exposure could cause.
Id. at 143-144.
32. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969) (Stewart, J., joined by
Brennan and White, JJ., concurring).
ments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material
a crime," the Majority opinion stated:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the
State or Federal government to make possession of other items,
such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods a crime. Our holding
in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's infringement
of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most
statutes making mere possession criminal. 33
If the Court has not overruled Stanley, then it has emasculated
its operation in Constitutional law to practically zero. But more
important, the attempt to distinguish rather than overrule Stanley
significantly weakens the already tenuous argument by the Court
that obscenity is a substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent.
The "Serious Value" Test
The Majority voted to abolish the constitutional standard an-
nounced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts34 which required that mat-
ter, in order to be judged obscene, must be proved to be "utterly
without redeeming social value."35 At the same time, however,
the Roth test was reaffirmed by the Court, which contained the
statement,
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance .... 36
In explaining away this apparent contradiction, Chief Justice Bur-
ger argued that the "utterly without" phrase in Roth was never
intended to be a test, nor an element of proof in a criminal trial,
as was asserted by the plurality opinion in Memoirs.
While Roth presumed "obscenity" to be "utterly without redeem-
ing social value," Memoirs required that to prove obscenity it must
be affirmatively established that the material is "utterly without
redeeming social value." Thus, even as they repeated the words
of Roth, the Memoirs plurality produced a drastically altered test
that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the
material was "utterly without redeeming social value"-a burden
virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of
proof.3
7
The Majority's reasoning is somewhat suspect. If the reason ob-
scenity is not protected by the First Amendment is because, in
the words of the Roth opinion, it is "utterly without redeeming
33. Id. at 568 n.11.
34. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
35. Id. at 418.
36. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) [emphasis supplied].
37. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1973) [emphasis in original].
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social importance," then in any judicial proceeding held to deter-
mine whether or not material is obscene, it would appear logically
necessary that the "social importance," or "social value" test as
stated in Memoirs, be one of the standards employed. To argue
otherwise, as the Court does, would amount to shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant. What the Court may be saying at this
point is that the first two tests in Memoirs, which are reformula-
tions of Roth, "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters,388 if met, together produce the legal conclusion that the
material is, "(c) utterly without redeeming social value." But it
then goes on to substitute a third test for the one struck down:
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.39
The conclusion seems to be that the "utterly without" test was
not a presumption or legal conclusion based upon proof of the first
two tests of Roth-Memoirs, but a separate constitutional standard.
The Court's argument that the "social value" test never com-
manded a majority of the Court therefore seems untenable.40
The second, and more appealing argument the Court gives for
eliminating the "social value" test, and replacing it with a "serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific [L.A.P.S.]" test is that it
places a burden upon the prosecution "virtually impossible to dis-
charge under our criminal standards of proof."' 41 While appealing,
38. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
39. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
40. But the definition of "obscenity" as expression utterly lacking
in social importance is the key to the conceptual basis of Roth
and our subsequent opinions. In Roth we held that certain ex-
pression is obscene, and thus outside the protection of the First
Amendment, precisely because it lacks even the slightest redeem-
ing social value.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
41. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
One should hardly need to point out that under the third com-
ponent of the Court's test the prosecution is still required to"prove a negative"--i.e., that the material lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 98 (1973) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
it is not convincing. Proving that material is obscene, and thus
outside the protection of the First Amendment ought to be ex-
tremely difficult because of the danger of overreaching likely to
occur on the part of jealous guardians of the public morality. The
Roth opinion, reaffirmed by this Court, stated:
All ideas having the slightest redeeming social importance-un-
orthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have full protection of the [First
Amendment] guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach
upon the limited area of more important interests.42
Presumably, the Majority believed that its "serious [L.A.P.S.]
value" test will ease the burden on the prosecution, so that "hard
core" pornography4 may properly be proscribed. It is doubtful
whether this will be the case. Proof of "seriousness" or the lack
thereof is just as nebulous, if not more so, than the "social value"
test discarded. The term, "serious" implies a judgment as to qual-
ity, a much more difficult determination than the one implied by
the term, "utterly without," which is a judgment as to quantity
or degree.
But the new test is subject to more severe criticism. First, the
term, "serious" may be read in several different ways. It can be
taken to mean the opposite of "light," which might allow the pre-
clusion of all humorous works relating to sexual matters. Much
of what comes under the broad definitions of "literature" and "art"
has as its only purpose light entertainment. Nothing instructional,
useful, or "serious" may be inherent in such works; but they do
serve a redeeming social purpose: that of easing tensions and of
providing means of periodic escape so necessary for adjustment to
an urban, technological society, overwhelming in its complexity."
"Serious" might also be taken to refer to the motive or intent
of the author of the work. Any literary, artistic, political or sci-
42. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The 'more important interests" referred
to involve for the most part considerations of national security. See
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
43. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring):
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material
I understand to be embraced within that short-hand description
["hard-core pornography"]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligently doing so. But I know it when I see it....
Id.
44. Judge Leventhal (U.S. Court of Appeal, D.C. Cir.) is optimistic con-
cerning the protection to be afforded humorous works:
[T]he protection surely extends to movies offered for mere amuse-
ment, say, horseplay. Presumably, the Court's reference to "seri-
ous" L.A.P.S. values does not outlaw the comic side of literary
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entific work produced and sold for commercial gain may become
suspect as to its seriousness of purpose, and consequently pro-
scribed.4 5 This interpretation was adopted for some purposes in
Ginzburg v. United States,46 which held that "in close cases evi-
dence of pandering may be probative with respect to the nature
of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth test." While
the Court in Ginzburg admonished that commercial activity per
se was not the deciding factor, by its decision it clearly limited
the extent to which publishers and disseminators may advertise,
thus indrectly making commercial exploitation a new, and perhaps
an independent test for obscenity.47
Apart from the interpretation of the term "serious," one may
question whether the Court has exhausted the "legitimate" cate-
gories of expression by expressly delineating the four terms, "lit-
erary, artistic, political, or scientific." Judge Levanthal of the
Washington, D.C., Circuit Court of Appeals, asks:
What, for example, about a serious sex education book? Is its
value literary, artistic, political, or scientific? If it is, these cate-
or artistic expression. Suppose some gifted comics evolve a hilari-
ous movie on mishaps in a nudist camp, and it is challenged as
including a lewd exhibition of the genitals. It seems likely that
the courts will be called to pass on portrayals and descriptions
of people in the nude and the claims of literary and artistic ex-
pression, and perhaps of social commentary, offered by the busi-
ness concerned.
Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 59 A.B.A.J.
1261, 1264-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Leventhal].
45. This interpretation, and the preceding one goes forth under the as-
sumption that the first two tests of obscenity announced by the Court,
(a) appeal to prurient interest, and (b) patently offensive description or
depiction of sexual conduct, have been met.
46. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
47. Testimony from numerous psychiatrists and marriage counselors at
Ginzburg's trial that they found the work useful in their professional prac-
tice was not contested seriously by the Government.
Petitioners, however, did not sell the book to such a limited audi-
ence, or focus their claims for it on its supposed therapeutic or
educational value; rather, they deliberately emphasized the sexu-
ally provocative aspects of the work, in order to catch the sala-
ciously disposed. They proclaimed its obscenity; and we cannot
conclude that the court below erred in taking their own evaluation
at its face value and declaring the book as a whole obscene despite
the other evidence....
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 472 (1966). The majority's opinion
in Ginzburg led Justice Douglas in his dissent to conclude that anything
could be an obscene object. Cf. Zimmerman, Can Anything Be an Aes-
thetic Object?, 25 J. AEsT~mucs & ART CRmcIsm 177 (1966).
gories are elastic.43
Similarly, it can be argued, as in Ginzburg, that material which
might otherwise be obscene can have serious "therapeutic" value
in psychiatric treatment or in marriage counseling.49 It would be
stretching the plain meaning of the four terms beyond the point
of "elasticity" to find a therapeutic element within them.
Another major objection to the Court's new test is that it fails
to provide a basis for determining the seriousness of the L.A.P.S.
value of the material. Unlike the first test, the "serious value"
test is not preceded by the phrase, "whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards ... ." According to
normal rules of construction this phrase would be applicable only
to a determination of "(a) whether . . . the work ... appeals to
the prurient interest."' 0 The question remains open, therefore, as
to whom the value of the work must be serious. 51 Moreover, the
nature of the prosecutions burden in proving, and the criteria to
be employed by the jury in judging, whether the work lacks "ser-
ious [L.A.P.S.] value" is unresolved by the formulation. As held
in Kaplan,52 the State is not constitutionally required to proffer
"expert" evidence on the question of obscenity, where the material
in question is admitted into evidence.58 This would necessarily ex-
48. Leventhal, supra note 43, at 1264.
49. See note 47, supra.
50. This construction of the tests is supported by the fact that the
phrase, "taken as a whole," is repeated in the "serious value" test (clause
(c)), whereas, the "average person" phrase is not.
51. As in the Ginzburg case, the possibility exists that the material may
have serious value to a particular class of people and still be judged ob-
scene.
52. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
53. Id. at 121. In California, however, the State is required to produce
affirmative expert testimony to establish community standards. In re
Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 910 (1969). The California Supreme Court, in asserting this re-
quirement, stated,
Relying principally on the well established doctrine that jurors
should not be endowed with the prerogative of imposing their own
personal standards as the test of criminality of conduct, we hold
that expert testimony should be introduced to establish community
standards.
69 Cal. 2d at 573, 446 P.2d at 543, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The California
State Legislature, however, amended its chapter on obscenity subsequent
to In re Giannini to no longer require affirmative expert evidence. CAL.
PEN. CODE § 312.1 (West Supp. 1973) provides:
In any prosecution for a violation of the provisions of this chapter
or of Chapter 7.6 (commencing with Section 313), neither the pros-
ecution nor the defense shall be required to introduce expert wit-
ness testimony concerning the obscene or harmful character of the
matter or live conduct which is the subject of any such prosecu-
tion. Any evidence which tends to establish contemporary com-
munity standards of appeal to prurient interest or of customary
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clude the need to prove that the material lacks serious value, ac-
cording to some expert evaluation. What standards of literary,
artistic, political or scientific excellence may the jury apply? The
formulation of the test, as noted above, precludes the jury from
employing mere "community standards." Can jurors, who might
be trusted to decide for themselves whether the work appeals to
the prurient interest, also be expected to possess the requisite aca-
demic knowledge to judge the literary or artistic value of a work?
It is quite arguable that the question of serious value is not an
issue for the trier of fact at all. While the three tests announced
in Miller are introduced by the phrase, "The basic guidelines for
the trier of fact must be: . . ." the Court suggests at a later point
in the opinion that only the first two guidelines involve issues of
fact.5 '4 More sensible is the conclusion that the issue in clause (c)
of the guidelines is not one of fact but one of aesthetic, academic,
or scientific judgment, requiring knowledge and training beyond
the capacity of the average juror. The holding of the Court that
the State need not produce expert evidence on the question of ob-
scenity ultimately may mean that the serious value test is not a
separate guideline, but only a restatement of one or both of the
first two, "prurient appeal" and "patently offensive." At best, the
test will be reduced to a question of individual taste, rather than
informed aesthetic, academic, or scientific judgment.
The "Patently Offensive" Test
The other change in the substantive tests to be applied was "(b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
limits of candor in the description or representation of nudity, sex,
or excretion, or which bears upon the question of redeeming social
importance, shall, subject to the provisions of the Evidence Code,
be admissible when offered by either the prosecution or by the
defense.
The question remains as to the effect of § 312.1 upon the holding of the
Court in In re Giannini. If the holding is to be regarded as required by
State constitutional law, then the legislation has no effect. Kaplan, how-
ever, clearly indicates that the production of expert testimony is not a re-
quirement of the federal Constitution.
54. These [the issues of "prurient appeal" and "patent offensive-
ness"] are essentially questions of fact, and our nation is simply
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
* . . This language had not apppeared in Roth except where
"obscenity" was limited to "material which deals with sex ....
It first appeared in Memoirs in a different form:
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contem-
porary community standards relating to the description or repre-
sentation of sexual matters. .... 57
Whereas Memoirs gives a definition of what is meant by "patently
offensive," the new guideline does not; and because the entire
Memoirs formulation (excepting paragraph (a), the Roth test) was
rejected by the Court, one cannot rely, with any assurance, on the
Memoirs definition of the term.
The new rule also requires that in order for a depiction or de-
scription of sexual conduct to be proscribed, it must be "specifically
defined" by state statute. The Court gives two examples of what
a State could define for regulation under the second test:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of mastur-
bation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.55
The Court suggests that the new requirements will provide ade-
quate safeguards against vagueness or ambiguity of interpretation,
thereby giving "fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his
public and commercial activities may bring prosecution," 59 and pro-
viding "positive guidance to the federal and state courts alike."6 0
This assurance is somewhat self-serving, particularly in light of
the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Brennan.
55. Id. at 24.
56. The language in CAL. PN. CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1973) which
defines "prurient," is derived, not from the Roth opinion, but from Ameri-
can Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) "Obscene Defined" (Offi-
cial Draft, 1962). See discussion of § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957),
infra, pp
57. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
58. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). It is understood that
these are subjects for definition, rather than definitions themselves. The
Court cites as examples of statutes containing specific definitions, OREGON
LAws 1971, ch. 743, Art. 29, §§ 255-262 (Supp. 1973), and HAWAI PENAL
CODE, Tit. 37, §§ 1210-1216, 1972 HAwAui SESsiONs LAWS, Act 9, ch. 12, pt.
II, at 126-29. The Court cautions that these references do not imply that
all States other than Oregon and Hawaii are obliged to enact new obscen-
ity statutes in order to meet the "patently offensive" test. Id. at 24 n.6.
One should note that the Oregon law applies only to juveniles, and it is
doubtful that the specific acts described (e.g., "bare nipples of the postpu-
bertant female breast") could withstand a constitutional challenge with
respect to adults.
59. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
60. Id. at 29.
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Justice Douglas, citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati,61 argued that
the term, "offensive" was unconstitutionally vague,6 2 because it
subjects the exercise of free expression to an unascertainable
standard:
How we can deny Ohio the convenience of punishing people who
"annoy" others and allow California power to punish people who
publish materials "offensive" to some people is difficult to square
with constitutional requirements.
63
The defect is not remedied by the enumeration of specific sexual
or excretory acts, since it is clear that not all representations or
depictions of such acts may be proscribed-only those which are
"patently offensive."
Justice Brennan argues that the vagueness inherent in the Miller
tests is compounded by the fact that persons are compelled to guess
not only whether their conduct is covered by a criminal statute,
but also whether their conduct falls within the constitutionally
permissible reach of the statute. The resulting level of uncertainty
is utterly intolerable, not alone because it makes "[b]ookselling
... a hazardous profession," [Citation omitted] but as well because
it invites arbitrary and erratic enforcement of the law.6 4
He concludes that this uncertainty produces a "chill on protected
expression" above and beyond the lack of fair notice. Just as the
61. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
62. The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the stat-
ute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held crim-
inally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably un-
derstand to be proscribed.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). It was suggested in
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959), that,
stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be ap-
plied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech;
a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because
the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.
63. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 46 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Coates case dealt with a city ordinance making it a crime for three
or more persons to assemble on a street and conduct themselves "in a
manner annoying to persons passing by." The Court, in striking down
the ordinance, stated,
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus
the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requies a person
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensive norma-
tive standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct
is specified at all.
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
64. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87-8 (1973).
man on the street is unable to determine whether his conduct is
punishable, so is the state or federal judge who is called upon to
review the conviction on appeal. This, argues Justice Brennan, has
created an undue stress on state and federal judicial machinery.
Since, "one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until
at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure
standards, have pronounced it so,"65 a continuing state of tension
exists between the state and federal courts. This is so because
the need for an independent determination by the Supreme Court
of the United States,
seems to render superfluous even the most conscientious analysis
by state tribunals. And our inability to justify our decisions with
a persuasive rationale-or indeed, any rationale at all-necessarily
creates the impression that we are merely second-guessing state
court judges.606
Two additional problems mar the workability of the "patently
offensive" test. The first problem concerns the application of the
test to the material being adjudicated. Nowhere in the clause con-
cerning patent offensiveness is there a limitation on how the mate-
rial is to be viewed in making such a judgment; whereas, in the
"prurient interest" and "serious value" guidelines the instruction
is included that the matter must be "taken as a whole."'67 As
Judge Levanthal points out:
[Tjhe words "taken as a whole" are omitted from the patent of-
fensiveness test. Is the jury to be instructed that it is enough if
one page of a 300-page book is patently offensive, even though
the book as a whole is not? I do not see the reason for the dif-
ference in treatment, which is not explained.68
Further, noted also with respect to the "serious value" test, the
Court gives no standard for the application of the "patently of-
fensive" test. The "community standards" application pertains
only to the question of prurient appeal. Thus, it is unclear
whether the Court, in adopting the "patently offensive test" means
to suggest a national or local standard. At one point the Court
argues that the First Amendment does not require that,
there are, or should or can be fixed, uniform national standards
of precisely what appeals to the "prurient interest" or is "patently
offensive." [Emphasis supplied] These are essentially questions
of fact, and our nation is simply too big and too diverse for this
Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articu-
lated in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite con-
sesus exists.69
65. Id. at 92.
66. Id. at 93.
67. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
68. Leventhal, supra note 44, at 1263.
69. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
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Yet, in the very next sentence, the Court implies that the com-
munity standards provision applies only to the "prurient interest"
test:
When triers of fact are asked to decide whether "the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards" would consider
certain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to require that
the answer be based on some abstract formulation.70
Since, as noted above, the question of offensiveness is a subjective
one, the Court must clarify whether the term, "patently" is to be
read as an absolute limitation, applying throughout the nation, or
as varying from community to community.
Beyond the question of vagueness a further problem besets the
new test: how can a depiction of sexual conduct be both appealing
to the prurient interest and patently offensive at the same time?
71
This paradox has been with us since the Memoirs decision, and the
Supreme Court in Miller, rather than resolving it, has reenacted
it. If the average person applying contemporary community stand-
ards finds the work sexually arousing, it comes close to being an
absolute contradiction to suggest that he will find it patently of-
fensive as well. As noted above, the "average person" formulation
does not precede the "patently offensive" test. Thus, it may be
that two different classes of individuals are being described: the
average man, who will be sexually aroused, and the Victorian
"prude" who will be revolted, sickened or disgusted at the depic-
tion.
Two attempts at resolution of the paradox other than the one
suggested above have been made. In Mishkin v. New York,72 the
appellant's major contention was that the material in question was
not obscene under the Roth standard because to the average per-
son, "instead of stimulating the erotic, they disgust and sicken."73
Justice Brennan writing for the majority replied that the argu-
ment was based on an "unrealistic interpretation" of the prurient
appeal test:
70. Id.
71. It should be recalled that the standards announced in Miller are
cumulative: all three must be met in order for the work to be found ob-
scene. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 26 (1973).
72. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
73. Id. at 508. Most of the materials in the case dealt with such sexual
deviations as sadomasochism, fetishism, and homosexuality.
Where the material is designed for, and primarily disseminated to
a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied
if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group.74
A similar argument was made by defendants in State v. J-R Dis-
tributors, Inc.,75 decided after the announcement of the Miller
standards. After citing Mishkin v. New York, the Washington Su-
preme Court stated:
Logically, defendants' argument is a virtual concession that the
materials are worse than obscene.... If this [their argument]
is true, the obscenity displayed in the two questioned exhibits
amounts to "hard core pornography" in its strongest sense.7 6
Neither Mishkin nor the Washington case confront the real para-
dox contained in both the Memoirs and Miller formulations cited
above. In essence the trier of fact is required to apply two sets
of standards: (1) those of the average sexual deviant, to deter-
mine if the material appeals to his or her prurient sexual interst;
77
and (2) those of the average normal person in determining whether
the material is "patently offensive" to that person. Where the ma-
terial is aimed at the average person, however, the trier of fact
must resort to an even more obscure application in order to find
the material both erotic and offensive. It seems clear that at no
time may the same "average person" standard be used and retain
the logical distinction which the Court wishes to draw between
prurient appeal and patent offensiveness. Thus the juxtaposition
of the two tests within the same formulation renders it worse than
vague: it becomes a logical impossibility to apply.
The Application of "Contemporary Community Standards"
The first reference to the use of community standards as a means
of judgment whether material is obscene appeared in Roth v.
United States.78 There is ample evidence to suggest the reference
was drawn from two sources, United States v. Kennerley79 and
74. Id. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) which reaf-
firms the Mishkin decision.
75. 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973). "They assert that the ma-
terial is so sexually abhorrent that it would repulse the average man
rather than create an appeal to his 'prurient interest'." Id., 512 P.2d at
1076.
76. Id., 512 P.2d at 1077 [emphasis in original].
77. Such a task the trier of fact may be clearly unqualified to perform
in the absence of, or even with, "expert testimony on the community stand-
ards" of the deviant sexual group.
78. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
79. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. In Kennerley,
Judge Learned Hand, attacking the "most susceptible" test estab-
lished in Regina v. Hickin,80 argued for a standard unrelated to
particular sensibilities:
If there be no abstract definition, such as I have suggested, should
not the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the present critical
point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the
community may have arrived here and now? ... To put thought
in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable,
but to fetter it by necessities of the lowest and least capable seems
a fatal policy.8 1
The Roth Court also cited with approval 82 the definition of obscen-
ity contained in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
8 3
The Code defines as "obscene," material that taken as a whole ap-
eals predominantly to the prurient interest "if it goes sub-
stantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or rep-
resentation of such matters as nudity, sex, or excretion."
The A.L.I. drafters apparently favored a national perspective in
the application of its test, and provided for the admission of evi-
dence of "the degree of public acceptance of the material in this
country."8 4 In justifying the inclusion of this provision, the drafts-
men noted:
Customs do indeed vary among our states, but it would be un-
fortunate to have no evidence on "public acceptance," in a case
where material is challenged so promptly in a particular jurisdic-
tion that the only opportunity to test public acceptance has been
in other states. Also the divergence of custom between one state
and another is probably far less than the differences between var-
ious social and religious groups within any one state. Further-
more, since a large part of the responsibility in this area has been
assumed by the national government enforcing federal obscenity
legislation, a country-wide approach is almost unavoidable. That
which does not offend the sensibilities of most Americans is likely
to be in the area of controversial morals or aesthetics, inappro-
priate for penal control.8 5
80. [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
81. 209 F. 119, 121. Lockhart & McClure argue that Judge Hand was
contemplating a national community standard. Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 2, at 110. This argument was relied upon by Justice Brennan in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964):
It seems clear that... Judge Hand was referring not to state and
local "communities," but rather to "the community ... at large
... the public, or people in general."
82. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
83. MODEL PEN CODE § 207.10 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (2) (d) (Tent. Draft -No. 6, 1957).
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) Comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
Regardless of the intent of the Roth Court in adopting the com-
munity standards test, subsequent application of the test was far
from uniform. The Post Office and Justice Department treated
the test as implying local standards, and secured federal legislation
allowing "forum shopping" for the most easily obtained con-
victions.8 A number of courts also came to this conclusion and
applied a local standard under the apparent authority of Roth.
87
In 1964, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a theatre
manager for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film in violation
of Ohio law.88 The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court
was written by Justice Brennan, but concurred in only by Justice
Goldberg. Justice Brennan rejected that interpretation of Roth
which allowed the application of standards of a particular local
community from which the case arises.
[T]he constitutional status of an allegedly obscene work must be
determined on the basis of a national standard. It is, after all,
a national Constitution we are expounding.8 9
Justice Brennan's argument was based upon the theory that the
application of local community standards would create a chilling
effect ° on the dissemination of constitutionally protected mate-
rials in some places because sellers and distributors would be un-
willing to risk conviction by testing variations in standards from
place to place.
Chief Justice Warren dissented from the plurality opinion as well
as the judgment.
86. 72 Stat. 940 (1958), 39 U.S.C. § 259(c) (1958). Justice Frankfurter
had previously criticized the effect of such a provision in United States
v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944):
Plainly enough, such leeway not only opens the door to needless
hardship to an accused by prosecution remote from home and from
appropriate facilities for defense. It also leads to the appearance
of abuses, if not to abuses, in the selection of what may be deemed
a tribunal favorable to the prosecution.
87. See United States v. Frew, 187 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1960);
Four Star Publications, Inc., v. Erbe, 181 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (D. Ia. 1960);
People v. Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 862, 327 P.2d 636, 638, rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); People v. Brooklyn News
Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768, 771-72, 174 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817-18 (County Ct. 1958).
For a summary of the various approaches to "community standards" taken
by the States during the period between the Roth and Miller decisions,
see Shugrue, An Atlas for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards,
7 CsiGHToN L. REv. 157, 166-173 (1974).
88. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
89. Id. at 195.
90. The term is used to designate "spillover deterrence," i.e., persons
would be deterred not only from engaging in conduct prohibited by statute,
but from engaging in lawful conduct under the Constitution as well, due
to uncertainty as to the dividing line drawn by the statute between lawful
and unlawful conduct. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Cf.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 147 (1959).
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It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity
is to be defined by reference to "community standards," it meant
community standards-not a national standard, as is sometimes ar-
gued. I believe that there is no provable "national standard"
.... At all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one,
and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divne
one.9 1
The inability of a majority of members of the Court to agree
on the interpretation of the Roth phrase perpetuated the confusion
and mixed application of the rule. In People v. Adler,92 for ex-
ample, a California appellate court ruled that the appropriate
standards to be applied were those of the State of California. Not-
ing the split in Jacobellis, the court concluded that the correct in-
terpretation of Roth was that State or local community standards
were to be applied in determining prurient appeal. This holding
was reaffirmed by the appellate court in Miller, and was a basis
for appealing the State decision to the United States Supreme
Court.
Despite the persuasive evidence that Roth implied a national
standard, the Supreme Court, in Miller, held that the Constitution
does not require that the determination of whether or not material
appeals to the prurient interest be made by resorting to national
"community" standards.93 In upholding California's use of state-
wide standards, the Court argued,
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas,
or New York City .... People in different States vary in their
tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by
the absolutism of imposed uniformity.94
Two arguments against doing away with a national standard an-
nounced in Jacobellis by Justice Brennan were summarily dis-
missed by the Court. The first was the so-called chilling effect
which a pluralistic standard would have on sellers and distributors.
Faced with the prospect of multiple standards perhaps yet to be
91. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing).
92. 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726. Adler was cited by
the California Appellate Department, Orange County Superior Court as au-
thority for its holding in Miller that the State of California was the appro-
priate community.
93. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31-34 (1973).
94. Id. at 32-33.
articulated in any precise way, sellers and disseminators of mate-
rials dealing with some form of sexual conduct would be unwilling
to risk criminal conviction by testing variations in standards from
community to community. 95 As a consequence, the use of local
standards would have the effect of preventing the publication and
dissemination of constitutionally protected material, by virtue of
self-imposed censorship. The Court responded to the argument by
saying:
The use of "national" standards, however, necessarily implies that
materials found tolerable in some places, but not under the "na-
tional" criteria, will nevertheless be unavailable where they are
acceptable. Thus, in terms of danger to free expression, the po-
tential for suppression seems at least as great in the application
of a single nationwide standard as in allowing distribution in ac-
cordance with local tastes,...90
The Court's argument is fallacious, for it proceeds from two
premises, one of which is not necessarily true and one which is
definitely untrue. It is not necessarily true that national criteria
must be some sort of average, striking a balance between the most
conservative and the most liberal tastes. The national criteria
might indeed be very permissive, representing a constitutional ceil-
ing, or floor, depending on one's perspective, beyond which mate-
rial would receive no protection from criminal sanctions. But sec-
ondly, it is definitely not true that the Constitution requires States
to regulate and prosecute obscenity, a proposition which the Court
itself has rejected.0T Thus, even if the national standard were an
average, "places" which had a greater tolerance for materials than
the toleration level allowed by the national standard, would in no
way be required to adhere to the lower level.
Related to the first argument in favor of retention of a national
standard is appellant's assertion in Miller that retention is neces-
sary in order to avoid unconscionable burdens on the free flow
of interstate commerce. The Court rejected this assertion on the
grounds that there was "no indication that appellant's materials
were ever distributed interstate, s9 8 but went on to suggest that
even if there were interstate distribution,
[ojbscene material may be validly regulated by a State in the
exercise of its traditional local power to protect the general wel-
95. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193-195 (1964).
96. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973).
97. The States, of course, may follow such a "laissez faire" policy
and drop all controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what
they prefer, ... but nothing in the Constitution compels the States
to do so....
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) [emphasis in
original].
98. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973).
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fare of its population despite some possible incidental effect on
the flow of such materials across state lines. 9
It would appear that the effect of pluralistic standards on inter-
state commerce will be far from incidental. Assuming that the
new standards will affect only pornography, as the Court war-
rants,100 they will necessarily affect a billion dollar industry, 01
almost all of which flows in interstate commerce.
102
Several examples may help illustrate the nature and extent of
the burden imposed by multiple standards of what appeals to the
prurient interest. Granting the assumption made by the Court
that "[p] eople in different States vary in their tastes and atti-
tudes,"'03 national producers of films and books dealing with mat-
ters of sexual conduct would be required to produce and dissemi-
nate multiple editions of such materials. The number of such edi-
tions is not easily estimated, but potentially could number in the
hundreds or thousands if local community standards are found to
be permissible by the Court.104 The cost of doing business in such
a context may be prohibitive.
It has been contended that such a task may be less burdensome
for the motion picture industry, since films can be cut and spliced
for particular localities, 0 5 apparently with little difficulty. This
99. Id. at 32-3 n.13.
100. Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as
written or construed.
Id. at 27.
101. Coxm-bssIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 83-142.
102. The practical application of Miller, however, may not be limited
simply to pornography, as defined by the Court. See note 92 supra. The
Georgia Supreme Court has upheld a theatre owner's conviction under
Georgia's obscenity statutes for exhibiting the R-rated motion picture,
"Carnal Knowledge." Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, rev'd
sub nom. Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. - [No. 73557] (1973). (After this
article went to press, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in the
Jenkins case, holding that the film "Carnal Knowledge" did not meet the
"patent offensiveness" test announced in Miller. Jenkins v. Georgia, -
U.S. - (1974), 42 U.S.L.W. 5055, decided June 24, 1974. See discussion of
the Jenkins decision in the postscript to this article, infra at 950.
103. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).
104. See discussion of state vs. local standards p. 931 infra.
105. Leventhal, supra note 44, at 1263. He suggests, however, that books
are not as easily adapted to various community requirements. Id.
has been denied by at least one film company.10 It has also been
argued that the burden of multiple editions is one of the costs
of doing business, and no concern to the courts.1'07 Perhaps the
most unconscionable burden is not that producers and distributors
will have to adjust to pluralistic standards, but will be the extreme
difficulty in determining, with impunity, the specific tastes of a
local community. In the area of obscenity an otherwise feasible
"marketing study" may be impossible without incurring burden-
some costs of litigation'03 and possible criminal penalties. In most
cases, this burden will be upon the local seller rather than the
national producer.
Assuming the burden on interstate commerce to be more than
incidental, what are the constitutional limitations upon state regu-
lation of such commerce? Where there is a conflict between State
regulation and the national concern for the free flow of interstate
106. In response to a survey of motion picture companies conducted by
the author, one major company stated:
Major studio theatrical films are a national product. It is not eco-
nomically feasible to market them in a segmented manner. This
is precisely the reason why it is essential to our industry that the
[Miller and Paris] decisions be modified as to identify with ade-
quate specificity the type of product intended to be regulated.
The Motion Picture Association of America also shares this position
107. What is true is that under this ruling, producers and publishers
will no longer have a single, uniform national market for selling
their products. What they can sell in one town they cannot sell
in another. But that has always been true in the sales of goods
and services involving questions of taste....
Producers of "X" movies and pornographic books and magazines
can hardly expect the courts to do their marketing for them.
David Brinkley's Journal, NBC News, June 21, 1973, reproduced in Joseph,
How TV Covered the Obscenity Decision: A Revealing Case Study, 3
JuRis DocTon 14, 15 (1973). Ample evidence exists for Brinkley's argument
that media are equipped to decentralize production and marketing, and
indeed must be, in order to respond to diversification of tastes quite un-
related to questions of obscenity:
[I]n almost every other communications medium [except televi-
sion] we can trace a decreasing reliance on mass audiences. Every-
where the "market segmentation" process is at work...
"The old-style mass cinema audience ... is gone for good." In-
stead, multiple small audiences turn out for particular kinds of
films, and the economics of the industry are up-ended....
Between 1959 and 1969, the number of American magazines of-
fering specialized editions jumped from 126 to 235. Thus every
large circulation magazine in the United States today prints
slightly different editions for different regions of the country-
some publishers offering as many as one hundred variations.
ToFPLn, FuwunE SHOCK 276-278 (Bantam ed. 1970).
108. It cost $250,000 to defend "Deep Throat" in a Los Angeles obscenity
prosecution, and the first trial ended in a hung jury. VAnari , Oct. 26,
1973. Mr. Brinkley's comment to the contrary notwithstanding, producers
and sellers are forced to do their marketing in the courts, a significantly
more hazardous operation than the "market segmentation" process dis-
cussed by Toffler.
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commerce the test most often applied is the so-called "balancing"
test. 0 9 The balancing test requires that the benefit derived from
local regulation outweigh the implicit burden on interstate com-
merce before the regulation will be upheld. If we are to accept
the Court's rationale for excluding obscenity from the protection
of the First Amendment, i.e., that the State has a legitimate inter-
est in safeguarding its citizens from anti-social behavior caused by
the dissemination of obscenity, then we must establish also that
there exists in fact a difference among the States in the degree
of anti-social behavior likely to be caused by the same obscene
material. This would be the only legitimate basis for finding a
benefit innuring to the State which would outweigh the burden
on interstate commerce of non-uniform regulation. Such a finding
would be exceedingly difficult to prove. A policy based on such
a proposition would, in effect, be resurrecting the now discredited
Hicklin test.
Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that the regulation of obscen-
ity, even though that regulation may be substantially different in
application from the practice of another State, is a valid exercise
of the State's police powers, despite its effect on interstate com-
merce." 0 This justification appears to be somewhat simplistic in
light of previous decisions. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,"'
an authority cited by Miller, the Court stated:
The principle that, without controlling Congressional action, a
state may not regulate interstate commerce so as substantially to
affect its flow or deprive it of needed uniformity in its regulation
is not to be avoided by "simply invoking the convenient apologet-
ics of the police power .... ))112
Uniformity in commercial regulations has been an integral part
of this nation's economic system since the discarding of the Articles
of the Confederation." 3  The theory of a national economy has
often been used to invalidate State regulations despite the State's
claim of police powers. Where the national interest is supported
by the First Amendment right of free expression the benefits in-
herent in the free dissemination of ideas ought to outweigh any
109. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bibb
v. Navaho Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
110. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973).
111. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
112. Id. at 779-780.
113. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
peculiar local interest in a specific regulation which would have
the effect of isolating that community from interstate commerce.11 4
The argument is even more persuasive where reasonable alterna-
tives are available to the State or community, in promoting that
interest."5 Alternatives may indeed be available which would not
involve unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce,. 6 which the
Court has neglected to consider.
One further problem concerning the application of State versus
national standards was left unresolved by the Court; namely the
standard to be used by federal courts in applying federal statutes.
In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, decided the same. day
as Miller, the Court held that the standards enunciated in Miller
"are applicable to federal legislation,""17 but the interpretation of
this language, insofar as it bears on the question of community
standards is uncertain. Judge Levanthal correctly asks:
What community is to be used in making this application to fed-
eral legislation? Does not the principle that federal legislation is
to be given a uniform construction throughout the land require
that the federal judge or jury determine a federal obscenity case
by reference to a national standard on what appeals to prurient
interest or what is patently offensive?"i8
United States v. One Reel of Film,"9 decided after Miller, an-
swered in the affirmative.120 Chief Judge Coffin in a concurring
opinion provided a rationale:
[I]f 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a), which permits customs seizures, be said
to contemplate the application of state or local standards of prur-
ient appeal or patent offensiveness, the few commercial ports of
entry for foreign films or literature would be able to preclude such
114. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See also Baldwin
v. GAF Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); H.P. Hood and Sons v. Dumond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1939).
115. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Cf. Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939); Shelton v. Tuckwell, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
116. See SUGGESTED ALTERNATIvES, p. 938 infra.
117. 413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973).
118. Leventhal, supra note 44, at 1262. See also Manual Enterprises, Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) where Justice Harlan, joined by Justice
Stewart, argued:
We think that the proper test under this federal statute, reaching
as it does to all parts of the United States whose population
reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a na-
tional standard of decency.
119. 481 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1973).
120. Id. at 208 n. 2: "[Slince we do not read the Supreme Court as re-
quiring a local standard in proceedings under [19 U.S.C.] § 1305(a), we
find no error in the district court's assumption in this case." The film,
"Deep Throat," was confiscated by federal customs officials at Logan Air-
port, Boston, and was adjudged obscene ad forfeit by the district court,
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material from ever reaching other parts of this country where it
might not be considered obscene or where regulation, rather than
outright prohibition, might be in effect.
12'
In applying a national standard to the film the circuit court did
not pause to articulate what that standard was, or how it might
have differed either from the community standards of Boston or
the State of Massachusetts. One is left with the contradiction be-
tween the statement in Miller that a national standard is "unascer-
tainable"'12 2 and "an exercise in futility"1 23 and the apparent facil-
ity with which the First Circuit could and did apply such a stand-
ard.1
24
Despite the Court's intention to resolve the question of what con-
stitutes "community standards," confusion remains over what kind
of forum community is permissible. In Miller the Court approved
a statewide standard, but did not address itself to the question
of whether the State was the only appropriate community which
could be used, or whether governmental units within the State
are permissible. Decisions in State courts following Miller have
been mixed on the issue of which community may be employed.125
121. Id. at 210-11. But see pp. 950-52, infra.
122. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973).
123. Id. at 30. Leventhal resolves this dilemma by suggesting that,
[T]he proper construction of federal laws is to prohibit only those
items as obscene that could not be vindicated in any substantial
community market. That materials would pass muster in, say,
New York and California, if established by evidence of persons
knowledgeable as to their standards, would be enough to avoid
federal interdiction, without prejudice to prohibition by other
states.
Leventhal, supra note 44, at 1262.
124. In a federal prosecution of Miller under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, the 9th
Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, did not reach the question
of which standards were applicable, but merely held, in a memorandum
decision, that the material was clearly obscene under either local or a na-
tional standard. United States v. Miller, 482 F.2d 1379 (1973). One may
also inquire how the United States Supreme Court will now make inde-
pendent reviews of cases involving obscenity. Given the application of
"local" community standards to the "prurient interest" test, and most
likely, the "patently offensive" test, the Court will be limited to making
an independent review of whether the material lacks "serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value." Since expert evidence of community
standards is no longer required, there will be no basis in the record for
the Court to disturb a jury determination that the material was appealing
to the prurient interest and was patently offensive.
125. Some post-Miller decisions hold that the applicable community
standards may be "local." Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351, 358 (Supreme
At least one case has been accepted by the Supreme Court for
The current Term which presents this question squarely.121 The
appellant in that case was convicted by an Albany, Georgia jury
for exhibiting the film, "Carnal Knowledge." The Georgia Su-
preme Court affirmed on the basis that Miller allowed the use of
a "local" community standard. 2 7 If the Burger Majority votes to
affirm this case it will necessarily take on the additional burden
of having to define, either in Jenkins, or in subsequent cases, the
permissible parameters of the local community. 12  Standards of
taste are likely to differ appreciably even within cities and
towns. 2  Are we likely to have neighborhood block associations
asserting the right to exercise community control over the dissemi-
nation of books, magazines, and films? If the Court permits local
standards, the answer is most likely to be "Yes.' 83° It is clear
that in practice the effect of the ruling will be that jurors will
apply the standards of their own communities and more likely,
their own personal tastes. The fact that materials may be declared
obscene in Orange County, and not obscene in Los Angeles County
does not appear to concern the Court.' 13
Ct. Fla. 1973); Brazelton v. State, 282 So. 2d 342, 343 (Ala. Crim. App.
1973); Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973). Others hold
that the applicable community standards must be statewide in scope.
State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 512 P.2d 1049, 1065 (Supreme Ct. Wash.
1973), cert. granted, - U.S. - [No. 73-937]; People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d
-, - N.Y.S.2d - (1973). One court has held that both statewide and
local standards should be applied. Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 777
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973). The State of Georgia has made inconsistent
and contradictory rulings. Jenkins v. State, supra (local), and Slaton v.
Paris Adult Theatre I, - Ga. -, -, 201 S.E.2d 456, 460 (1973) (on re-
mand from the U.S. Supreme Court).
126. Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. - [No. 73-557] (1973).
127. Id.
128. Even within a forum or local community there may be perti-
nent, more localized, communities. Is a college bookstore gov-
erned by the standards of the college community or of the town
or county in which the college is located?
Leventhal, supra note 44, at 1263.
129. It can well be argued that the State of California, in terms of vary-
ing tastes and attitudes, contains as much diversity as the nation as a
whole. To require juries to formulate in their minds a California standard
encompassing tastes and attitudes as diverse as those represented in the
Counties of Orange, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Imperial, Inyo and Hum-
boldt, or the cities within those counties is, under the Court's reasoning,
equally "an exercise in futility."
130. For an example of the effect of carrying the local standards test
to its logical extreme, see Gillers, People v. Lotsmore, 504 U.S. 718 (1998),
3 J nms DocToR 18 (1973).
131. This was actually the case with respect to Miller. A Los Angeles
County trial judge dismissed, before trial, a prior prosecution based upon
the same brochures. The Majority rejected Miller's "double jeopardy"
claim as improperly pleaded, and a matter -of state law. Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 34 n.14 (1973).
[VOL. 11: 906, 1974] 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the best conclusion to be drawn is that the Roth test
of "contemporary community standards," whether interpreted as
national, state, or local ought simply to be discarded. Materials
dealing with sexual conduct do not forego the protection of the
First Amendment solely on that basis; only such materials as pre-
sent a potential harm to the community are treated as unprotected
speech. The tests of "prurient appeal," "patently offensive," and
lack of "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value," are
justified only insofar as they relate to the State's legitimate inter-
ests in protecting its citizens from aberant, anti-social behavior,
or minimally from unwanted and unconsented to exposure to mate-
rial which the individual citizen finds offensive.18 2 If such is the
harm, then the State should be required to prove that a clear and
present danger exists that the harm will come about.183 Surely
the publisher of pornography may be afforded the same protection
as the anarchist who preaches violent revolution; and his conduct




In announcing the new standards the Court emphasized that "it
is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States.
That must await their concrete legislative efforts.' ' 34 Nor did it
hold that all States (excepting Oregon and Hawaii1 5) must enact
new obscenity statutes. Instead, the Court merely required that
prosecutions under obscenity laws be limited to depictions or rep-
resentations of sexual conduct as defined specifically under State
(or federal) law "as written or construed."'1 6 The decision thus
invited state courts to continue the practice of authoritative
construction of state obscenity laws.
A survey of remanded and original cases in the wake of Miller
finds almost all of the lower state and federal courts upholding
the validity of current legislation by the process of construing the
132. But see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Coates v. City
of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
133. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
134. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
135. Id. at 24 n.6.
136. Id. at 27.
statutes as requiring the use of Miller guidelines. States which
have taken this approach thus far include Alabama, 37 Califor-
nia,1 8 Florida, 3 9 Georgia, 40 Massachusetts,' 4 ' Missouri, 42 New
York, 43 Ohio,' 44 Texas, 45 and Washington. 46 In addition various
federal statutes dealing with obscenity have been authoritatively
construed as incorporating the Miller tests.
47
Two state supreme courts, however, have ruled that the obscen-
ity statutes in their respective States were unconstitutionally
vague in light of the Miller standards. The convictions in two
Indiana cases' 48 were vacated and remanded by the United States
Supreme Court 49 "for further consideration in light of Miller V.
California .... ,150 On remand, the Indiana Supreme Court re-
versed the convictions on the grounds that the two statutory pro-
visions' 5 ' were unconstitutional. 52
137. Brazelton v. State, 50 Ala. App. 723, 282 So.2d 342 (1973).
138. People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973).
After this article went to press a federal district court declared California's
obscenity statute to be unconstitutional. Miranda, et al. v. Hicks, et al.,
F. Supp. - (C.D. Cal. 1974).
139. Papp v. State, 281 So. 2d 600 (Fla. App. 1973) (prospective applica-
tion); Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973).
140. Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973); Slaton v. Paris
Adult Theatre I, - Ga. -, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973).
141. Commonwealth v. Claflin, 73 Adv. Mass. App. 475, 298 N.E.2d 888
(1973).
142. State v. Bird, 499 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1973).
143. Lynbrook v. United Artists Corp., 75 Misc. 2d 124, 347 N.Y.S.2d
856 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1973); Redlich v. Capri Cinema, 43 App. Div. 2d
27, 349 N.Y.S.2d 697, 42 U.S.L.W. 2297 (1974), rev'd, 75 Misc. 2d 117, 347
N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
144. State ex rel. Keating v. "Vixen," 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d
880 (1973).
145. Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1973).
146. State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049
(1973).
147. United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1973), aft'd, Hamling
v. United States, - U.S. -, 42 U.S.L.W. 5035 [No. 73-507] (1974) (18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1461); United States v. Miller, 482 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir.
1973) (18 U.S.C. § 1461); United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir.
1973) (18 U.S.C. § 1462); United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206
(1st Cir. 1973) (19 U.S.C. § 1305 (a)).
148, Stroud v. State, - Ind. -, 273 N.E.2d 842 (1971); Mohney v. State,
- Ind. -, 276 N.E.2d 517 (1971).
149. Stroud v. Indiana, 413 U.S. 911 (1973); Mohney v. Indiana, 413 U.S.
911 (1973).
150. Id.
151. IC 1971, 35-30-10-1 [IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-2803 (Burns Repl. 1956)],
"Obscene literature and devices"; IC 1971, 35-30-10-3 [IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-2803a (Burns Repl. 1956)].
152. Stroud v. State, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973); Mohney v. State,
- Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 66 (1973). Chief Justice Afterburn's opinion was
[voL. 11: 906, 1974] 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions
SAN DIEGO LAW BEVIEW
The Louisiana Supreme Court also struck down that state's anti-
obscenity statute.153  A related "common nuisance" statute
54
which allowed the State to close a theatre for one year for the
showing of obscene films was also struck down as an unlawful
prior restrain and a denial of due process. 155
In Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan'56 a Three Judge District Court
struck down New Jersey's anti-obscenity statute 57 on the grounds
that it was not susceptible to any saving judicial construction un-
der Miller, in light of prior legislative history. 5 8 In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the Court stated:
A construction of N.J.S. 2A:115-1.1 (Supp. 1973) embodying the
Miller standard would have to stand upon the premise that a state
can enact a statute which, although specifically intending to pro-
scribe certain sexually-oriented material, would "intend" to pro-
scribe something less if the standard it had intended to create
turned out to be unconstitutional. To permit this kind of statutory
construction, however, is equivalent to condoning a criminal stat-
ute that would prohibit "all expression not permitted by the First
Amendment." The offense to due process inherent in such a vague
legislative enactment is apparent.159
the same in each case:
The main thrust of those [the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court obscen-
ity-pornography] opinions, so far as applicable to this case, is that
the statute under which the appellant was convinced is unconstitu-
tional for the reason that it is too general in nature and does not
set out specifically the sexual or obscene acts which, when de-
picted in any of the media named by the statute, constitute a vio-
lation of the statute.
Stroud v. State, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1973); Mohney v. State,
- Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 66, 67 (1973).
153. Louisiana v. Shreveport News Agency Inc., - La. -, 287 So. 2d
464 (1973). See LA. REv. STAT. § 14:106(2) C-).
154. LA. REv. STAT. § 13:4711-13:4717 (-).
155. Gulf State Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v. Richardson, - La. -, 288
So. 2d 649 (1973), review granted, Cryan v. Hamar Theatres, Inc., - U.S.
-, 42 U.S.L.W. 3591 [No. 73-711] (1974).
156. 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1973).
157. N.J.S. 2A: 115-1.1 (Supp. 1973). See also Cine-Com Theatres East-
ern States, Inc. v. Lorde, 351 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.J. 1972).
158. See N.J.S. 2A: 115-1.la (Supp. 1973) ("Legislative findings," L. 1971,
ch. 449, § 2, eff. Feb. 16, 1972).
159. Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312, 1327 (D.N.J. 1973)
[footnotes omitted]. The Court concluded that the statute was unconsti-
tutional because:
(1) it would proscribe material that possessed serious literary, ar-
tistic, political or scientific value; (2) it would proscribe material
that did not depict or describe sexual conduct in a patently offen-
sive manner; and (3) it cannot be construed as specifying the kind
No State has yet acted to revise its law concerning obscenity
in light of the Miller standards. No action is contemplated in
California, the State wherein Miller was convicted.160 The New
York Senate and Assembly Codes Committees, however, held hear-
ings in October of 1973 to consider amendments to the New York
obscenity laws in light of Miller. 61 One may expect that unless
the Supreme Court overturns the decisions noted above, Indiana,
Louisiana and New Jersey, at least will be forced to adopt new
legislation.
Reactions from the Industry
In an effort to make a realistic assessment of the impact of the
1973 obscenity-pornography decisions on the communications in-
dustry, motion picture producers, theatre owners and publishing
houses were sent a questionnaire concerning that issue. The ques-
tionnaire asked the respondents to comment on (1) the extent to
which Miller v. California had affected their policies concerning
the production of materials which potentially could be subjected
to an obscentity prosecution; and (2) whether they had modified
or were contemplating the modification of policies relating to na-
tional marketing and/or distribution of such materials, in light of
the local community standards test announced in Miller.
The number of returns was too few to constitute a valid sample.
However, of the companies responding to the survey only one, a
motion picture company, replied that Miller had affected its pro-
duction policies, and that the decision had merely "accelerated" its
movement toward more family entertainment films (G and PG
rated). Three respondents reported some impact on distribution
of materials. One publisher stated, "We do avoid inflammatory
covers and we help our wholesalers keep adult reading out of com-
munities and areas that are violently offended by this type of
of sexual conduct the depiction of which can be proscribed under
Miller.
Id. at 1328-29. Compare, United Artists Corp. v. Harris, 363 F. Supp. 857
(W.D. Okla. 1973); Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Ga. 1973)
vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 42 U.S.L.W. 4300 (1974) (in light of San-
ders v. State, [No. 28352, Jan. 28, 1974] - Ga. -, - S.E.2d - (1974) which
struck down the application of § 26-2101 of the Criminal Code of Georgia
in a case involving similar facts. The Court considered that Speight could
no longer show irreparable injury in light of the Sanders decision.).
160. Telephone interview with Assemblyman Bob Wilson's Office, Feb.
15, 1974. Presumably, this means that 'the "redeeming social importance"
test found in CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(a) (West 1970) will continue to be
the standard in California. See People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900,
109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973). But see note 138, supra.
161. 204 PUmLIsmms WEEKIY 30 (Nov. 5, 1973).
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material." Several of the respondents concluded that in light of
the pending review of Jenkins v. Georgia62 by the Supreme Court,
it would be precipitous to attempt to formulate new policies con-
cerning either production or distribution. Many respondents sim-
ply referred the author to the positions taken by their respective
trade associations.
Trade associations have been much more vocal in their evalua-
tion and response to the 1973 decisions. The Association of Ameri-
can Publishers in its September 19, 1973, meeting called for the
repeal of all federal, state, and local legislation that prohibits the
sale, exhibition, or distribution of sexually explicit materials to
consenting adults.163 Almost all the media trade associations filed
amici briefs in the Jenkins case. 64 They all have taken the posi-
tion that statewide, rather than local community standards should
be constitutionally required. The Directors Guild of America, for
example, took the position that:
A rule permitting judges and jurors to apply the singular stand-
ards of a town, county or rural area in deciding whether material
is obscene would impose an intolerable burden on the distribution
and dissemination of communication. It is not feasible to prepare
different versions of books, magazines and films for distribution
in different parts of each of the states.' 65
A final means of assessing the impact of Miller on the communi-
cations industries is to examine the nature of materials currently
being prosecuted, where such information is available. A partial
162. - U.S. - [No. 73-557] (1973).
163. 102 I==zLcECT 140 (1973):
Kenneth D. McCormick, Senior Editorial Consultant, Doubleday
& Co., and Chairman of the [AAP] Freedom to Read Committee,
said that, because of the Supreme Court's decisions on June 21,
1973, establishing new guidelines for obscenity prosecutions, it was
"now more important than ever that our lawmakers, jurists and
every concerned citizen read the [Obscenity and Pornography]
commission's report and give serious and rational consideration to
its recommendations."
Id.
164. Trade associations filing amici briefs included the Authors League
of America, the National Association of Theatre Owners, Adult Film Asso-
ciation of America, Inc., the Directors Guild of America, and the American
Library Association.
165. Brief for Directors Guild of America at 7, Jenkins v. Georgia, -
U.S. - [No. 73-557]. The amicus went on to state the opinion of the DGA
"that all communication to adults who wish to receive it, is protected
against regulation by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 8.
listing of materials which have gained national prominence fol-
lows:
Motion Pictures: "Carnal Knowledge,"'1 66  "Last Tango in
Paris,"' 67  "Deep Throat,"'168  "Vixen,"'' 69  "Behind the Green
Door."170
Books: The Illustrated Presidential Report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography,'7' A Clockwork Orange.
1 2
Magazines: Playgirl,73 Playboy, Oui, and Penthouse.
174
These prosecutions would suggest that national motion picture pro-
ducers, distributors and publishers which heretofore could rely on
non-interference with their products by state and federal authori-
ties, can no longer continue to do so without risking seizures and
prosecutions, some of which may be successful.
SUGGESTED ALTEPNATivEs
Given the continuing problems of First Amendment encroach-
ment, 75 vagueness of standards,176 and their application 17
7 implicit
in the Supreme Court's new constitutional guidelines on obscenity,
state legislatures would do well to ponder the options now avail-
able to them. Presented below are three sets of alternatives which
may be feasible for legislative enactment. It should be noted that
no attempt has been made to present precise legislative language
but only the basic approach with specific illustration in some cases.
These proposals are offered in view of the conclusion drawn above,
166. Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, rev'd, - U.S. - [No.
73-557] (1974) (Albany, Ga.).
167. Oklahoma City threatened prosecution. United Artists Corp. v.
Harris, 363 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
168. Monmouth County, N.J. See Hamar Theatres Inc. v. Cryan, 365
F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1973); see also United States v. One Reel of Film,
481 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1973) ("Deep Throat" seized at Port of Entry).
169. Hamilton, County, Ohio: State ex rel Keating v. A Motion Picture
Entitled "Vixen", 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
170. Redlich v. Capri Cinema, Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 27, 349 N.Y.S.2d 697
(1974) (New York City).
171. United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'd
sub nom., Hamling v. United States, - U.S. - [No. 73-507] (1974) (San
Diego, Calif.).
172. Oram, Utah. Letter from Publisher to author, Jan. 28, 1974.
173. Letter from distributor to author, Feb. 4, 1974.
174. These three publications have been seized in Macon, Georgia, Hope-
well, Virginia, Prattville, Alabama, Gulfport, Mississippi, and Ashland,
Ohio, noted in Gartner, If You Think I Look Silly ..... 3 Juis DocToR
11 (Aug./Sept. 1973).
175. See discussion p. 919 supra.
176. See discussion p. 920 supra.
177. See discussion pp. 921-26 supra.
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that mere authoritative construction of current state statutes by
judicial agencies within the State are inefficacious and undesirable
means of solving "the intractable obscenity problem."
178
"Adults Only Model
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
concluded that:
[A]fter 16 years of experimentation and debate I am reluctantly
forced to the conclusion that none of the available formulas, in-
cluding the one announced today, can reduce the vagueness to a
tolerable level while at the same time striking an acceptable bal-
ance between the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments on the one hand, and on the other the asserted state interest
in regulating the dissemination of certain sexually oriented ma-
terials .... Although we have assumed that obscenity does exist
and that we "know it when [we] see it," . . . we are manifestly
unable to describe it in advance except by reference to concepts
so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected
and unprotected speech. 179
He therefore called for an end to any absolute state suppression
of sexually-related material insofar as consenting adults are con-
cerned:
I would hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of distribution
to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Gov-
ernments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented
materials on the basis of their allegedly "obscene" contents.18 0
The Court criticized Justice Brennan for this approach because
he offered no guidelines on how to distinguish between protected
and unprotected materials which may be disseminated to juveniles
and unconsenting adults.18 ' What is presented below is an attempt
178. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
179. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973).
180. Id. at 113. Justice Brennan admitted that "[d]ifficult questions
must still be faced, notably in the areas of distribution to juveniles and
offensive exposure to unconsenting adults." Id. at 114.
181. Paradoxically Mr. Justice Brennan indicates that suppression of
unprotected obscene material is permissible to avoid exposure to
unconsenting adults, as in this case, and to juveniles, although he
gives no indication of how the division between protected and non-
protected materials may be drawn with greater precision for these
purposes than for regulation of commercial exposure to consenting
adults only. Nor does he indicate where in the Constitution he
finds the authority to distinguish between a willing "adult" one
to delineate the way in which a State may safeguard juveniles
and unconsenting adults from unwanted or undesirable exposure.
§ 101. All laws in the State prohibiting the manufacture, sale, dis-
semination or exhibition of obscene materials to consenting adults are
hereby repealed.' 8
2
§ 102. Safeguards Against Undesirable Exposure to Juveniles and Un-
consenting Adults.
a. It shall be unlawful for any person to display publicly any
material which depicts by photograph or drawing explicit sexual
conduct.183
1) "Public display" means any presentation on a building, bill-
board, sign, or in a newspaper or magazine cover which is visible
to the passerby on a public thoroughfare.
2) "Explicit sexual conduct" means any of the following acts:
a) sexual intercourse between two or more persons;
b) oral-genital contact between two or more persons;
c) oral-anal contact between two or more persons;
d) anal-genital contact between two or more persons;
e) any of the above acts between one or more persons and
an animal or the dead body of a human being;
f) acts of human torture or sadomasochistic abuse when per-
formed within a sexual context;
g) acts of masturbation, self or other induced, manually, or
with the aid of an artificial device;
h) exposure of the human genitals.8 4
month past the state law age of majority and a willing "juvenile"
one month younger.
If one were to adopt a "liquor" analogy to the obscenity problem, rather
than Chief Justice Burger's totally unjustified "heroin" analogy, the diffi-
culty in adopting Justice Brennan's proposal would be far less severe than
that intimated by the Court. See Justice Brennan's reply to the above
criticism, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 114 n.29.
182. This would allow the consenting adult to patronize and consume
whatever "obscene" material he wished. The only limitation would be on
the viewing of "live" sexual conduct. See United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1972).
183. Cf. Cunningham, Billboard Control Under the Highway Beautifica-
tion Act of 1965, 71 MrcaL L. RV. 1296 (1973); See also Rabe v. Washington,
405 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Adequate justifica-
tion has been presented for protecting the unconsenting adult from un-
willing exposure. See Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736,
738 (1970); KuH, Censorship With Freedom of Expression, in CEsoRsmp
mm FREEDom oF ExPRussioN 131, 135 (H. Clor ed. 1971); Gellhorn, Dirty
Books, Disgusting Pictures, and Dreadful Laws, 8 GA. L. REv. 291, 307-09
(1974). A special exception may be required in the case of textbooks deal-
ing with sex education adopted by a duly authorized Board of Education
of Trustees. The State can prevent the abuse of this exception by private
"schools" through the use of its certification requirements for educational
institutions.
184. See OREGoN LAWS 1971, ch. 743, Art. 29, §§ 255-262 for alternative
examples of sexual conduct and exposure of the genitals which may be
prohibited. The Oregon statute would proscribe a greater array of sexual
acts and sexual exposure than what is proposed here. See also N.Y.
PFNAL LAw §§ 235.20-.21 (McKinney 1967), which prohibits commercial
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b. It shall be unlawful for any person to mail or send any un-
solicited material depicting explicit sexual conduct as described in
2a(2) above, or to send such materials in response to a specific
order or request without requiring proof that the intended recip-
ient is over the age of 18 years.'
8 5
c. It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, disseminate or
exhibit any material which depicts explicit sexual conduct as de-
scribed in 2a(2) above to any person under the age of 18 years.8 0
§ 103. Locations of businesses dealing in sexually explicit materials.
Each municipal corporation chartered under the laws of this
state and each county which has jurisdiction over unincorporated
areas may prohibit, under its zoning regulations, the operation of
any business which sells, disseminates, or exhibits material which
depicts explicit sexual conduct as defined in 2a(2) above within
a certain distance of a school, child care center, church, park, pub-
lic playground, or residentially zoned property.87
The advantage to this proposal is that it avoids completely the
necessity of making value judgments on what "appeals to the pru-
rient interest" or what is "patently offensive." It also avoids the
difficulty inherent in determining the literary, artistic, political or
scientific value of material alleged to be obscene. While there are
some restrictions on the seller and disseminator who wish to en-
gage in a lawful business, these restrictions are no greater than
those placed on other persons who market products potentially
harmful to juveniles.38  While the interest of the State in protect-
distribution of materials to minors which stress nudity, sexual acts, or
sadomasochistic abuse that is found to be harmful to minors, upheld by
the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Com-
pare Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) which struck down MicH.
PENAL CODE § 343 which made a juvenile standard applicable to adults
as well.
185. This provision would apply to Miller, since the brochures in ques-
tion depicted explicit sexual conduct, and were sent to unconsenting adults.
Brochures which linguistically, rather than pictorially describe such ma-
terial are unaffected by this provision.
186. In light of recent legislation conferring adult status on persons aged
18 years or over, this age limit is recommended as being more consistent
with such provisions.
187. Cf. Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objec-
tivity, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1438 (1973). But see Nortown Theatre Inc. v.
Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 369-70 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
188. Businesses under such regulation include liquor stores, bars, and
tabocconists. Sale or dissemination of alcoholic beverages to a minor may
not only cost the proprietor his license, but may make him criminally lia-
ble for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See, e.g., CAL. PEN.
CODA § 272 (West 1970). Cf. Vachon v. New Hampshire, - N.H. -, 306
A.2d 781, rev'd, - U.S. -, 42 U.S.L.W. 3403 (1973).
lug juveniles and unconsenting adults from unwarranted exposure
to such materials, the consenting adult is left free to consume or
not to consume as he or she sees fit. s9
"Sexual Conduct" Model
Throughout the Miller majority opinion the Court admonishes
that it is concerned only with the regulation of graphic portrayal
of explicit sexual conduct, also referred to as "hard core pornog-
raphy."'190 This would seem to suggest that the Court is much
more concerned with exhibition, i.e., presentations which are "live"
or on film, than of literary representations, as in the case
of books,'0 ' or artists' renditions. Assuming that the State has
a greater interest in prohibiting graphic displays, it might be ad-
vantageous for the State to abandon the concept of obscenity al-
together and simply prosecute on the basis of actual sex acts com-
mitted in public or on film. It is clear that "obscenity" cases can
be prosecuted under sex act statutes when actual sexual conduct
is involved.0 2
189. [T]here is developing sentiment that adults should have com-
plete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume whatever
communicative materials may appeal to them and that the law's
involvement with obscenity should be limited to those situations
where children are involved or where it is necessary to prevent
imposition on unwilling recipients of whatever age.
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971). Chief Justice Burger
rejects the argument by saying,
[S]tate regulation of hard core pornography so as to make it un-
available to nonadults, a regulation which Mr. Justice Brennan
finds constitutionally permissible, has all the elements of "censor-
ship" for adults; indeed even more rigid enforcement techniques
may be called for with such dichotomy of regulation.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973). To be sure, the above model
places some restrictions on access to such materials by consenting adults,
but hardly in a manner which would justify the appelation of "censorship."
No censorship of content is made except with respect to the time, place
and manner in which the material may be exhibited. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
190. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2, 27, 29, 35, 36 (1973).
191. But see Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) decided the same
day as Miller which held that an unillustrated book with plain cover could
be found to be obscene. See also Judge Leventhal's criticism of the Kap-
lan decision. Leventhal, supra note 44, at 1263. The Court has recognized
that motion pictures are not "necessarily subject to the precise rules gov-
erning any other particular method of expression," Joseph Burstyn Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952), and has held that they are subject
to prior censorship under carefully drawn statutes. Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
192. See, for example, CAL. PEN. CoDE §§ 288a, 286, 314 (West 1970).
Under these statutes live theatrical performances and motion picture pro-
ductions have been subject to prosecution. See People v. Drolet, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1st Dist. 1973); People v. Schwartz, No.
A-282165 (Super. Ct. 1972) (appeal pending -Cal. App. 3d -, - Cal.
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Such an approach has been urged for the State of California.19 3
As an example, Cal. Pen. Code § 288a would be amended so as
to exclude theatrical or film productions from its scope and a
new statute drafted:
New Statute
(a) Any person participating in an act of copulating the mouth
of one person with the sexual organ of another, when said act is
recorded on film and said person has knowledge that said act is
being filmed, or in a theater, if part of a theatrical production pre-
sented for an admission fee, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) Any person who displays for an admission fee a film or the-
atrical presentation depicting the acts described in (a) or records
such an act on motion picture film shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor.19 4
The approach suggested above could easily be extended to other
specific acts of actual sexual conduct performed in a theatre or
recorded on film. The following statutory outline illustrates the
second model for state legislation:
§ 101. Public presentations of actual sexual conduct; punishment
(a) Any person participating in an act of sexual conduct as
defined in subsection (b), when said act is recorded on film and
said person has knowledge that said act is being recorded on still
or motion picture film, or in a theatre, if part of a theatrical pro-
duction presented for an admission fee, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) For purposes of this section, "sexual conduct" includes any
or all of the following acts:
(1) sexual intercourse between two or more persons;
(2) oral-genital contact between two or more persons;
(3) oral-anal contact between two or more persons;
(4) anal-genital contact between two or more persons;
Rptr. - (1974); People v. Parker, 33 Cal. App. 3d 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354
(2d Dist. 1973). See also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), reh.
denied, 410 U.S. 948 (1973).
193. Comment, New Prosecutorial Techniques and Continued Judicial
Vagueness: An Argument for Abandoning Obscenity as a Legal Concept,
21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181 (1973).
194. Id. at 237-38. The author of the comment argues:
The specific legislation articulates social goals. Rather than
placing nebulous concepts in the hands of the courts, they are a
direct reflection of popular will and, in a sense, of the community
standard. Legislators who draft unpopular sex act statutes for
the theatre can be turned out of office; conversely candidates who
propose popular regulation can be elected. As always, judicial re-
view will be essential, but the obscenity laws will be just like
the myriad other regulations with which courts must deal: spe-
cific prohibitions, not specific modes of conduct within vague
boundaries, will be evaluated.
Id. at 239.
(5) any of the above acts between one or more persons and
an animal, or the dead body of a human being.195
(6) acts of masturbation, self or other induced, manually, or
with the aid of an artificial device.
(c) Any person who displays for an admission fee a theatrical
production depicting any of the acts described in subsection (b)
or who records such acts on film, or who sells or displays for
an admission fee such acts recorded on film is guilty of a misde-
meanor.19 6
(d) Every person who, with knowledge that a person is a mi-
nor under the age of 18 years, employs such minor to commit any
of the acts described in subsection (b) is punishable by imprison-
ment in the state prison for one to five years or a fine of no more
than $10,000, or both.
Every person who otherwise employs any other person to com-
mit the acts described in subsection (b) is guilty of a misde-
meanor.19
7
Assuming that a State has a legitimate interest in controlling
the production and dissemination of "obscene" materials even with
respect to consenting adults, the proposed model offers a superior
vehicle for pursuing that interest. It avoids most, if not all of
the problems of vagueness inherent in the Miller standards for ob-
scenity, and establishes a precise standard under which prosecutors
may operate.
198
This greater degree of certainty is achieved at some expense of
coverage. Literary, or linguistic descriptions are not subject to
prosecution under this model, nor are sexual "acts" which are
merely simulated, either by actual models, or by artists' renditions.
The model does, however, stand for the principle that:
Conduct or depictions of conduct that the state police power can
prohibit on a public street do not become automatically protected
by the Constitution merely because the conduct is moved to a bar
or "live" theatre stage, any more than a "live" performance of a
man and woman locked in sexual embrace at high noon in Times
195. Cf. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 1967).
196. Cf. People v. Massey, 137 Cal. App. 2d 623, 290 P.2d 906 (2d Dist.
1955) (conspiracy to violate CAL. PEN. CODE § 311 upheld).
197. The State's interest in protecting minors from engaging in actual
sexual conduct where such acts are commercially exploited for public exhi-
bition is clearly a valid one. See note 193 and accompanying text supra.
"Parental consent" for such modeling would not remove such an act from
criminal sanction under the proposed statutory model. Cf. THE ILLus-
TRATED PREsIDn NTIAL REPORT OF THE CO1\nISSION ON OBSCENqrY AND PORNOG-
RAPHY 90-93 (1970).
198. In Los Angeles County only about 44% of the persons against whom
obscenity charges were brought were convicted in 1970-71. This compares
with an 80% to 90% conviction rate for most categories of crimes. Comment,
New Prosecutorial Techniques, supra note 193, at 185 n.16. See also Teeter
& Pember, The Retreat From Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HAST.
L.J. 175, 176 (1969).
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Square is protected by the Constitution because they simul-
taneously engage in a valid political dialogue.199
One difficulty faced by the prosecution under the "Sexual Con-
duct" model is proving that actual, as opposed to simulated sexual
conduct took place. Similar problems of proof exist in other areas
of the criminal law, and are far less insurmountable than the re-
quirements of proof for the Miller guidelines. Given the uncer-
tainty still present in the Supreme Court's tests for obscenity a
State may well choose to avoid the problem altogether and rely
on a modified version of its sex act statutes.
Miller "Obscenity" Model
The least desirable alternative for the States from an economic
200
as well as administrative point of view, is to continue to deal with
the problems inherent in prohibiting obscenity. At the very least,
States should redraft their statutes in order to bring them into
line with the Miller standards, rather than relying on their courts
to construe present statutes on a slow, case by case basis. The
third alternative attempts to present a statutory model closest to
the line drawn by Miller as dividing constitutional and unconsti-
tuional means of suppressing materials dealing with sexual con-
duct.
§ 101. Obscenity.
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, disseminate, or exhibit
any material found to be obscene in a civil proceeding described
below.
§ 101.1 Civil Proceedings.
No criminal prosecution may be instituted against any person for
selling, disseminating or exhibiting obscene material without a
prior adjudication in civil court on the question of obscenity. In
order to secure a judicial determination on the question of obscen-
ity, the Prosecution must bring a civil quasi-in-rem proceeding
against the material itself.20 1
199. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).
200. The Commission estimated the aggregate cost of enforcing state ob-
scenity statutes at $5 to $10 million per year, and federal enforcement to
be at least $3 to $5 million per year. ComlvnssioN REPORT, supra note 16,
at 42-43.
201. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See also Pilpe], Obscenity and the Constitution, 204 PuBmismms WEEKLY
24, 26 (1973).
a. Under the civil action there shall be a full adversary pro-
ceeding on the question of obscenity, utilizing standards hereinaf-
ter set forth.
b. Relief under the civil proceeding is limited to forfeiture of
the seized material and a permanent injunction against sale, dis-
semination or exhibition of that material or copies thereof, once
a final adjudication of the question has been made. Criminal pen-
alties may be imposed for selling, disseminating or exhibiting such
material after it has been found to be obscene, or for violation
of a permanent injunction issued under the civil proceedings
against such sale, dissemination or exhibition.
§ 101.2. Standards to be applied in civil proceeding.
a. Any proceedings brought pursuant to this section is limited
to the following kinds of materials:
(1) actual or simulated acts of sexual conduct when performed
in a theatre for which an admission fee is charged;
(2) actual or simulated acts of sexual conduct recorded on film
which is offered for sale or exhibition;
(3) graphic or animated depictions of sexual conduct which are
offered for sale or exhibition.
b. For purposes of this section "sexual conduct" is defined as
(1) sexual intercourse between two or more persons;
(2) oral-genital conduct between two or more persons;
(3) oral-anal contact between two or more persons;
(4) anal-genital contact between two or more persons;
(5) any of the above acts between one or more persons and
an animal or the dead body of a human being;
(6) acts of human torture or sadomasochistic abuse when per-
formed within a sexual context;
(7) acts of masturbation, self or other induced, manually or
with the aid of an artificial device.
c. The standard which the trier of fact shall apply to materials
subject to proceedings brought under this section shall be:
whether the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interst of either
(1) the average adult applying contemporary statewide com-
munity standards; or
(2) a discrete and insular deviant sexual group; or
(3) minors under the age of 18 years,
where such appeal presents a clear and present danger of anti-
social conduct prohibited by state law.
§ 101.3. Requirements of proof.
a. In any action commenced under the proceedings described
in this section, the prosecution shall be required to offer affirma-
tive expert evidence of statewide community standards of prurient
appeal under § 101.2c(1) above, or the statewide standards of the
special groups referred to in § 101.2c(2)-(3) above. Such evidence
shall include but not be limited to:
[VOL. 11: 906, 1974] 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
(1) the degree to which the material in question or compar-
able material20 2 has caused anti-social conduct proscribed by state
law;
(2) the degree to which the material possesses or lacks re-
deeming social value to the specific group for which the material
was designed.
b. In the absence of affirmative evidence that the material was
intentionally aimed primarily at one of the groups described in
§ 101.2c(2)-(3) above, the determination of prurient appeal shall
be presumptively based on the average adult as described in §
101.2c(1).
c. For purposes of this section, "redeeming social value" means
that where the material in question is found to be otherwise ob-
scene under § 101.2a-c, the social value of the material is such
that it outweighs the interest of the State in suppressing it. Re-
deeming social value may be established by the production of af-
firmative expert evidence of the literary, artistic, educational,
scientific, therapeutic, or political value of such material or com-
parable material.203
§ 101A. Certain institutions exempted.
a. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to the following in-
stitutions:2
0o
(1) scientific and educational institutions engaged in experi-
mental or academic research requiring the use of such materials;
(2) libraries, museums and other depositories where the col-
lection of such materials has historical value;
(3) federal, state and local governmental agencies.
b. The above exemptions shall apply only where the institu-
tions described in § 101.4a above
(1) provide adequate safeguards against exposure to minors
under the age of 18 years and unconsenting adults;
(2) do not advertise, or otherwise hold out such materials for
exhibition or sale to the general public.
The alterations of Miller in the above model are fairly clear:
(1) a civil in rem proceeding is made mandatory; (2) the "patently
202. A judicial determination of what constitutes "comparable material"
is required before such material may be admitted into evidence. Cf. Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, at 18, Hamling v. United States, - U.S. -
[No. 73-507].
203. Id.
204. See REV. CODE WASH. § 9.68.015. Cf. State v. J-R Distributors, Inc.,
82 Wash. 2d 584, -, 512 P.2d 1049, 1061 (1973).
offensive" test is removed;20 5 (3) the burden of proof established
for the State is the clear and present danger test which is required
in other First Amendment cases; 206 (4) "seriousness" as a measure
of value is deleted and the Roth-Memoirs formulation of "redeem-
ing social value" is reinstated, with reference to the Miller refine-
ments; and (5) the requirement of affirmative expert evidence is
reinstated for the purposes of showing the statewide community
standards, the clear and present danger of anti-social conduct, and
the lack of any redeeming social value.
20 7
CONCLUSIONS
After Miller v. California we are no nearer to a resolution of
the question of what makes something obscene. At best, the de-
cision maintains the status quo, by reaffirming Roth. At worst,
the decision regresses us to a pluralistic concept of the meaning
of obscenity, with as many different community standards as there
are juries applying them, and a concept, which, due to the increas-
ing pervasiveness of the mass media, and the increasing mobility
of the population, is even less tenable than a decade ago when
Jacobellis was decided. Constitutional doctrine involving the First
Amendment is hardly an appropriate area to experiment with
modes of "New Federalism."
Nor do we see any serious attempt to justify and explain the
205. See notes 70-76 and accompanying text supra.
206. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Terminello v. City
of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
207. While a work may be the best evidence of its obscenity, it can shed
no light on the prevailing statewide standards of what appeals to the pruri-
ent interest, nor can it describe for the jury the standards to be applied
in measuring its social value. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
See also Shugrue, supra note 87, at 179-181. A related argument is that
where the prosecution is permitted but not required to produce expert
affirmative evidence on community standards significant injustices will
result by virtue of prosecutorial discretion:
For example, in a liberal community, a prosecutor may elect to
offer expert testimony, hoping to convince the jurors that the
state-wide standard is less permissive than the standard existing
in the community where the jurors reside. A different result may
be reached in a conservative community, where the prosecutor
may avoid expert testimony hoping that the conservative jurors
will apply their more restrictive personal interpretation of com-
munity standards. With such a choice, the prosecutor virtually
selects the community through use of expert testimony or lack of
it.
Comment, Miller v. California: A Search for a New Community, 5
U.W.L.A.L. REv. 63, 67 n.30 (1973). This argument assumes, of course, that
statewide, rather than local community standards are in effect, and that
expert testimony offered by the defense is ruled inadmissible or not be-
lieved by the jury if admitted.
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policy of excluding obscene materials from the protection of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, a policy which owes its consti-
tutional existence to a dictum in Chaplinski v. New Hampshire.
2°
As Justice Douglas points out,20 1 there is little historical evidence
on which to base a conclusion that the Framers intended obscenity
to be outside the protection of the First Amendment. Nor does
the Court come to grips with the empirical evidence currently
available on the supposed harm caused by dissemination of obscen-
ity, but decides instead that it is up to the legislatures to evaluate
conflicting data.
210
Finally, the Court does nothing to resolve the potential injus-
tices which may arise from the application of vague standards in
criminal cases. The new requirement that states must specifically
define what depictions or representations of sexual conduct are for-
bidden has yet to materialize in any state statutes, and may never
do so, given the "authoritative construction" option given by the
Court to the states. 211 Nor would such statutes, if adopted, nec-
essarily have the effect of providing adequate safeguards against
injustices, when the specific definitions of sexual conduct are to
be judged by pluralistic "contemporary community standards" of
what is "prurient" and at the same "patently offensive."
The alternative models for legislation proposed in this article are
attempts to provide workable and just standards for state regula-
tion of obscene materials. By no means do these models solve all
of the problems inherent in such regulation, and in many cases,
they may create new problems. In the long run, as is the case
with many other social problems, education, not legislation may
be the only effective solution.
212
208. 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942).
209. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-71 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See also United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 806-09 (1956)
(Frank, J., concurring).
210. The Court in the past has utilized empirical findings in support
of conclusions of Constiutional law. See Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Loewy, Abortive Reasons and
Obscene Standards: A Comment on the Abortion and Obscenity Cases,
52 N.C.L. REV. 223, 237 (1973).
211. See discussion pp. 933-34 supra.
212. See CommssIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 32-41.
POSTCRIPT: THE LESSONS OF
HAMLING AND JENKINS
After this article went to press the Supreme Court handed down
two decisions2 13 which purportedly clarified some of the issues left
unresolved by the 1973 cases. Discussion of these two cases is,
by necessity of space, limited to the issues raised in the body of
this article.
214
In the first case, Hamling and others were convicted of mailing
and conspiring to mail an obscene brochure advertising an "illus-
trated" version of the Report of the Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 and 1461, in United States
District Court (S.D. Cal.). The jury was unable to agree on
whether the book itself, published by Greenleaf Classics, Inc.,215
was obscene, and the District Court declared a mistrial. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.21 ( The Supreme Court
granted certiorari2 7 and subsequently affirmed the convictions.
Community Standards.
The Court used the Hamling case to answer some of the ques-
tions concerning the meaning of community standards which had
been raised after Miller was decided a year ago. These clarifica-
tions may be summarized as follows:
1. A "national" community standard is not required in federal
obscenity prosecutions. Laying to rest any doubt as to the appli-
cation of the Miller local community doctrine to federal prosecu-
tions,218 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five man majority, con-
cluded,
The result of the Miller cases, therefore, as a matter of constitu-
tional law and federal statutory construction, is to permit a juror
sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge of the community
or vicinage from which he comes in deciding what conclusion "the
213. Hamling v. United States, - U.S. - (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, -
U.S. - (1974), both decided June 24, 1974.
214. The author expresses his appreciation to the San Diego Law Review
for making the space available for this addendum.
215. The jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty as to Greenleaf on the
counts of mailing and conspiracy to mail.
216. Hamling v. United States, 481 F.2d 307 (1973).
217. - U.S. - [No. 73-507] (1974).
218. In United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-130
(1973) the Court stated:
We have today arrived at standards for testing the constitutional-
ity of state legislation regulating obscenity... These standards
are applicable to federal legislation.
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average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would reach in a given case.219
The majority was unperturbed by Justice Brennan's dissent which
pointed out that the legislative intent of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 prescribed
a national, rather than a local st ndxad, 22° dismissing it out of
hand.
2 2 1
2. Statewide community standards are not required for any ob-
scenity prosecution. Anticipating the issue raised in Jenkins,222 de-
cided the same day, Justice Rehnquist dispelled any notion that
the Miller tests -require, as opposed to permit, the application of
statewide community standards:
Our holding in Miller that California could constitutionally pro-
scribe obscenity in terms of a "statewide" standard did not mean
that any such precise geographic area is required as a matter of
constitutional law.2 23
In the Jenkins opinion Justice Rehnquist went on to imply that
the notion of state-wide community standards is just as "hypotheti-
cal" as that of national standards, and that Miller was not in-
tended to require state or federal courts to adhere to such a notion
or to instruct juries to apply statewide community standards.
2 24
219. Hamling v. United States, - U.S. -, - (1974) [emphasis added].
220. Id. at-, n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The legislative history of § 1461 gives not the slightest indication
that the application of local standards was contemplated. Indeed,
the remarks of an early sponsor of the provision indicate that ap-
plication of a national standard was intended....
See 4 Cong. Rec. 696 (1876) (remarks of Rep. Cannon). See also Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 & n.10.
221. Both of these arguments are foreclosed by our decision last
Term in United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, supra, that the
Miller standards, including the "contemporary community stand-
ards" formulation, applied to federal legislation. The fact that dis-
tributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to vary-
ing community standards in the various federal judicial districts
into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal
statute unconstitutional because of the failure of application of
uniform national standards of obscenity. Those same distributors
may be subjected to such varying degrees of criminal liability in
prosecutions by the States for violations of state obscenity statutes;
we see no constitutional impediment to a similar rule for federal
prosecutions.
Hamling v. United States, - U.S.-, - (1974).
222. In Jenkins, the Georgia Supreme Court sustained a conviction of
an Albany, Ga. theatre owner on the grounds that Miller allowed stand-
ards of local communities to be used.
223. Haming v. United States, - U.S. -, - (1974).
224. We agree with the Supreme Court of Georgia's implicit ruling
3. No precise geographic community need be specified at all. It
was argued in this article as well as by others225 that should the
Court permit less than a statewide standard to be applied, it would
take on the additional burden of specifying the acceptable parame-
ters of a "local community." The majority of the Court refused
to do so, and deferred to the States the choice of whether or not
to specify the community.
22 6
Presumably, the most limited community from which standards
might be drawn is the vicinage from which the jury is selected.22 7
Yet there is no constitutional requirement that it be so limited,
and a trial court, in a particular case may well allow the admis-
sion of evidence of "community standards" which are derived from
a statewide assessment, or even a national one, without violating
the Miller test.228 All that is required by the Miller test of "con-
temporary community standards" is,
. ..to assure that the material is judged neither on the basis of
each juror's personal opinion, or by its effect on a particularly
sensitive or insensitive person or group. 229
The ultimate effect of these glosses on the meaning of "contem-
porary community standards" is to render the constitutional safe-
guard of Roth, adopted by the Burger majority in Miller, totally
without substance. Each State, each court, and indeed each ju-
that the Constitution does not require that juries be instructed in
state obscenity cases to apply the standards of a hypothetical
statewide community. Miller approved the use of such instruc-
tions; it did not mandate their use.
Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. -, - (1974).
225. See discussion of local community standards, infra, pp. -; see also
Adams, Dirty Stuff: The Redeeming Cultural Importance of the Obscene,
2 COLUM. FoRuv (no. 3) 2, 7 (1973); Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting
Pictures, and Dreadful Laws (John A. Sibley Lecture, Feb. 8, 1974) 8 GA.
L. REv. 291, 299 (1974); Levanthal, supra, note 44, at 1263.
226. A State may choose to define an obscenity offense in terms
of "contemporary community standards" as defined in Miller with-
out further specification, as was done here, or it may choose to
define the standard in more precise geographic terms, as was done
by California in Miller.
Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. -, - [emphasis added].
227. Since this case was tried in the Southern District of California,
and presumably jurors from throughout that judicial district were
available to serve on the panel which tried petitioners, it would
be the standards of that "community" upon which the jurors
would draw.
Hamling v. United States, - U.S. -- - (1974).
228. Id. at-:
But this is not to say that a District Court would not be at liberty
to admit evidence of standards existing in some place outside of
this particular district, if it felt such evidence would assist the jury
in the resolution of the issues which they were to decide.
229. Id. at -.
[VOL. 11: 906, 1974] 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ror 230 is free to decide without apparent constitutional restraint,
what, among materials dealing with sex, appeals to the prurient
interest. Such a ruling is likely to have the most pernicious con-
sequences, the most objectionable of which is the denial of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Absent a specific
rule, such as in California, that a statewide standard is to be ap-
plied, the same work, under the same state statute may be found
to be obscene and not obscene by various communities. It is even
possible to have local, state and national standards applied within
a single metropolitan area. The evils of forum shopping have al-
ready been discussed with respect to the 1958 amendments to 18
U.S.C. § 1461;231 the community standards test adopted by the
Court in Hamling and Jenkins compounds these evils into unimag-
inable horrors.
232
Deviant Groups and Prurient Interest
Among the many assignments of error charged by the petitioners
in the Hamling case was that the trial court judge gave instruc-
tions on the determination of prurient appeal based upon the sensi-
bilities of deviant groups as well as those of the "average person."
The Supreme Court sustained the use of such instructions, citing
230. Without the requirement that the community be defined, each juror
is free to substitute his personal opinion of the work for any conceived
of aggregate opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist's assurances to the contrary
notwithstanding.
231. See discussion supra, p. 924.
232. Justice Rehnquist replies that,
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views
of the average person in the community or vicinage from which
he comes for making the required determination, just as he is en-
titled to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a "reasona-
ble" person in other areas of the law.
Hamling v. United States, - U.S. -, -. The argument is premised on
the theory that the "reasonable man" standard is defined exclusively in
terms of a local community or vicinage. Prosser suggests that,
[W]here common knowledge and ordinary judgment will recog-
nize unreasonable danger, what everyone does may be found to
be negligent, and there will be extreme cases where it is so clearly
negligent in itself that it [evidence of community custom] may
even be excluded from evidence.
Prosser, LAw OF TORTS, 4th ed., § 33, p. 168 [footnotes omitted]. Other
differences suggest themselves: the reasonable man is not a constitutional
doctrine, but one of common law; nor is it subject to the constraints of
a direct fiat against inhibiting free expression.
Mishkin v. New York.233 This holding is clearly a misapplication
of the Mishkin rule, which stated,
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated
to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public
at large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satis-
fied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that
group.23.
No evidence was offered by the government in the Hamling ease
that the brochure in question was designed for and primarily dis-
seminated to one or more deviant sexual groups, yet the govern-
ment was permitted to offer, without such a foundation, expert
evidence on the prurient appeal which the brochure most likely
would have on various deviant groups.
23 5
While the Mishkin rule was clearly an either/or test as to pru-
rient appeal, the Court's affirmance in Hamling transforms it into
a both/and test, with no requirement of specific intent to dissemi-
nate to sexually deviant groups.236 This transformation also rein-
carnates "the inadequac[ies] of the most-susceptible-person facet
of the [Regina v.] Hicklin [ (1868) L. R. 3 Q.B. 360] test,"23 7 which
Mishkin sought to avoid. The adoption of the both/and rule for
prurient appeal enmeshes the Court in a paradox more mind-bog-
gling than that described above with respect to the joint applica-
bility of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness. 238
The Content of "Patent Offensiveness"
In Jenkins v. Georgia the Court reversed the conviction of a the-
atre owner who displayed the film, "Carnal Knowledge" in Albany,
233. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
234. Id. at 508-509 [emphasis added].
235. In response to the defendants' motion for a bill of particulars, the
government alleged that the brochure appeals to the prurient interest of
the average person. The Court of Appeals, while admitting that this vari-
ance of proof was error, considered it to be non-prejudicial because (1)
the government expert's testimony was directed to the "Illustrated Report"
rather than the brochure, and (2) defendants offered rebuttal expert testi-
mony. This ruling overlooked that fact that all pictures contained in the
brochure were from the "Illustrated Report," and that defendants offered
rebuttal evidence only after its objection to the admission of the govern-
ment's evidence was overruled. Hamling v. United States, Petition for
Certiorari, pp. 50-51.
236. We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities
by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed
in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable re-
cipient group. ...
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966) [emphasis added].
237. Id.
238. See discussion infra, pp. 921-22.
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Georgia. The Court predicated its reversal of the Georgia Supreme
Court not on the grounds that local, as opposed to statewide stand-
ards were inappropriate, but on the basis that an independent
viewing of the film by the members of the Court revealed that
it did not contain patently offensive depictions of explicit sexual
conduct.239 Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, ar-
gued that nothing in the film could be considered to come within
the proscribed categories of patent -offensiveness listed by the
Court in Miller.
240
While the subject matter of the picture is, in a broader sense, sex,
and there are scenes in which sexual conduct, including "ultimate
sexual acts" is to be understood to be taking place, the camera
does not focus on the bodies of the actors at such times. There
is no exhibition whatever of the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise,
during these scenes. There are occasional scenes of nudity, but
nudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene under
the Miller standards.2
4 1
The Court concluded that the film "is simply not the 'public por-
trayal of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for ensuing
commercial gain' which we said was punishable in Miller."
242
There is nothing to suggest in the opinion that, had there been
a single scene in the film which a majority of the Court believed
to be patently offensive that the conviction would be reversed.243
Indeed, we are left with the implication that, had the camera fo-
cused on the bodies of the actors during the brief scenes depict-
ing sexual intercourse, the conviction would have been sustained.
The Court in fact provides us with no greater understanding of
what, in its view, is patently offensive or how to apply such a
test, except that a direct depiction of a woman's bare midriff would
be protected expression.244 The language of the Jenkins opinion
239. Our own view of the film satisfies us that "Carnal Knowl-
edge" could not be found under the Miller standards to depict sex-
ual conduct in a patently offensive way.
Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. -, - (1974).
240. (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ul-
timate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of mas-
turbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
241. Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. -- - (1974).
242. Id.
243. See discussion of the patent offensiveness test supra, pp. 917-22.
244. It would be wholly at odds with this aspect of Miller to uphold
an obscenity conviction based upon a defendant's depiction of a
ultimately harkens to Justice Stewart's notorious statement con-
cerning "hard core pornography. 245
The lessons of Hamling and Jenkins do nothing to alter the con-
clusions contained in this article, and, if anything, make them more
telling. The Congress, as well as the state legislatures should con-
sider carefully whether it is feasible or desirable to follow the cir-
cuitous path mapped out by the five-member majority of the
United States Supreme Court.
woman with a bare midriff, even though a properly charged jury
unanimously agreed on a verdict of guilty.
Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. -, - (1974).
245. See note 43, supra. Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion joined
in by Justices Stewart and Marshall criticized the Court's failure to enun-
ciate a standard which would give jurors and judges a clear basis for de-
termining the alleged obscenity of a work:
In order to make the review mandated by Miller, the Court was
required to screen the film Carnal Knowledge and make an inde-
pendent determination of obscenity vel non. * * *
Thus, it is clear that as long as the Miller test remains in effect
"one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at
least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure
standards, have pronounced it so." [Citation omitted].
Jenkins v. Georgia, - U.S. -, - (1974).
